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1Comparing Detection Methods For SoftwareRequirements Inspections: A ReplicatedExperimentAdam A. Porter Lawrence G. Votta, Jr. Victor R. BasiliAbstract|Software requirements specications (SRS) areoften validated manually. One such process is inspection, inwhich several reviewers independently analyze all or part ofthe specication and search for faults. These faults are thencollected at a meeting of the reviewers and author(s).Usually, reviewers use Ad Hoc or Checklist methods touncover faults. These methods force all reviewers to relyon nonsystematic techniques to search for a wide variety offaults. We hypothesize that a Scenario-based method, inwhich each reviewer uses dierent, systematic techniquesto search for dierent, specic classes of faults, will have asignicantly higher success rate.We evaluated this hypothesis using a 3 24 partial facto-rial, randomized experimental design. Forty eight graduatestudents in computer science participated in the experiment.They were assembled into sixteen, three-person teams. Eachteam inspected two SRS using some combination of Ad Hoc,Checklist or Scenario methods.For each inspection we performed four measurements: (1)individual fault detection rate, (2) team fault detection rate,(3) percentage of faults rst identied at the collection meet-ing (meeting gain rate), and (4) percentage of faults rstidentied by an individual, but never reported at the col-lection meeting (meeting loss rate).The experimental results are that (1) the Scenario methodhad a higher fault detection rate than either Ad Hoc orChecklist methods, (2) Scenario reviewers were more eec-tive at detecting the faults their scenarios are designed touncover, and were no less eective at detecting other faultsthan both Ad Hoc or Checklist reviewers, (3) Checklist re-viewers were no more eective than Ad Hoc reviewers, and(4) Collection meetings produced no net improvement in thefault detection rate { meeting gains were oset by meetinglosses.Keywords| Controlled Experiments, Technique andMethodology Evaluation, Inspections, Reading TechniquesI. IntroductionOne way of validating a software requirements specica-tion (SRS) is to submit it to an inspection by a team ofreviewers. Many organizations use a three-step inspectionprocedure for eliminating faults : detection, collection, andrepair1. [1], [3] A team of reviewers reads the SRS, iden-tifying as many faults as possible. Newly identied faultsare collected, usually at a team meeting, and then sent tothe document's authors for repair.This work is supported in part by the National Aeronautics andSpace Administration under grant NSG{5123. Porter and Basili arewith the Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland,College Park, Maryland 20472. Votta is with the Software ProductionResearch Department, AT&T Bell Laboratories Naperville, IL 605661Depending on the exact form of the inspection, they are sometimescalled reviews or walkthroughs. For a more thorough description ofthe taxonomy see [1] pp. 171 and [2].







GENERALFig. 1. Systematic Inspection Research Hypothesis. This gure represents a software requirements specication before and after anonsystematic technique, general and identical responsibility inspection and a systematic technique, specic and distinct responsibilityinspection. The points and holes represent various faults. The line-lled regions indicate the coverage achieved by dierent membersof the inspection team. Our hypothesis is that systematic technique, specic and coordinated responsibility inspections achieve broadercoverage and minimize reviewer overlap, resulting in higher fault detection rates and greater cost benets than nonsystematic methods.not assigned specic responsibilities and because they lacksystematic techniques for meeting those responsibilities.Somemight argue that Checklists are systematic becausethey help dene each reviewer's responsibilities and suggestways to identify faults. Certainly, Checklists often posequestions that help reviewers discover faults. However, weargue that the generality of these questions and the lack ofconcrete strategies for answering them makes the approachnonsystematic.To address these concerns { at least for software designs{ Parnas and Weiss introduced the idea of active designreviews. The principal characteristic of an active designreview is that each individual reviewer reads for a specicpurpose, using specialized questionnaires. This proposalforms the motivation for the detection method proposed inSection II-B.2.B. Detection MethodsAd Hoc and Checklist methods are two frequently usedfault detection methods. With Ad Hoc detection methods,all reviewers use nonsystematic techniques and are assignedthe same general responsibilities.Checklist methods are similar to Ad Hoc, but each re-viewer receives a checklist. Checklist items capture impor-tant lessons learned from previous inspections within an en-vironment or application. Individual checklist items mayenumerate characteristic faults, prioritize dierent faults,or pose questions that help reviewers discover faults, suchas \Are all interfaces clearly dened?" or \If input is re-ceived at a faster rate than can be processed, how is thishandled?" The purpose of these items is to focus reviewerresponsibilities and suggest ways for reviewers to identifyfaults.C. HypothesisWe believe that an alternative approach which gives in-dividual reviewers specic, orthogonal detection responsi-bilities and specialized techniques for meeting them will
result in more eective inspections.To explore this alternative we developed a set of fault-specic techniques called Scenarios { collections of proce-dures for detecting particular classes of faults. Each re-viewer executes a single scenario and multiple reviewers arecoordinated to achieve broad coverage of the document.Our underlying hypothesis is depicted in Figure 1: thatnonsystematic techniques with general reviewer responsi-bility and no reviewer coordination, lead to overlap andgaps, thereby lowering the overall inspection eectiveness;while systematic approaches with specic, coordinated re-sponsibilities reduce gaps, thereby increasing the overalleectiveness of the inspection.II. The ExperimentTo evaluate our systematic inspection hypothesis we de-signed and conducted a multi-trial experiment. The goalsof this experiment were twofold: to characterize the behav-ior of existing approaches and to assess the potential ben-ets of Scenario-based methods. We ran the experimenttwice; once in the Spring of 1993, and once the followingFall. Both runs used 24 subjects { students taking a gradu-ate course in formal methods who acted as reviewers. Eachcomplete run consisted of (1) a training phase in which thesubjects were taught inspection methods and the experi-mental procedures, and in which they inspected a sampleSRS, and (2) an experimental phase in which the subjectsconducted two monitored inspections.A. Experimental DesignThe design of the experiment is somewhat unusual. Toavoid misinterpreting the data it is important to under-stand the experiment and the reasons for certain elementsof its design 2.2See Judd, et al. [7], chapter 4 for an excellent discussion of ran-domized social experimental designs.
3Round/SpecicationRound 1 Round 2WLMS CRUISE WLMS CRUISEad hoc 1B, 1D, 1G 1A, 1C, 1E 1A 1D, 2BDetection 1H, 2A 1F, 2DMethod checklist 2B 2E, 2G 1E, 2D, 2G 1B, 1Hscenarios 2C, 2F 2H 1F, 1C, 2E 1G, 2A, 2C2H 2FTABLE IThis table shows the settings of the independent variables. Each team inspects two documents, the WLMS and CRUISE, oneper round, using one of the three detection methods. Teams from the first replication are denoted 1A{1H, teams from thesecond replication are denoted 2A{2H.A.1 VariablesThe experiment manipulates ve independent variables:1. the detection method used by a reviewer (Ad Hoc,Checklist, or Scenario);2. the experimental replication (we conducted two sep-arate replications);3. the inspection round (each reviewer participates intwo inspections during the experiment);4. the specication to be inspected (two are used duringthe experiment).5. the order in which the specications are inspected (ei-ther specication can be inspected rst).The detection method is our treatment variable. Theother variables allow us to assess several potential threatsto the experiment's internal validity. For each inspectionwe measure four dependent variables:1. the individual fault detection rate,2. the team fault detection rate 3,3. the percentage of faults rst identied at the collec-tion meeting (meeting gain rate), and4. the percentage of faults rst identied by an indi-vidual, but never reported at the collection meeting(meeting loss rate).A.2 DesignThe purpose of this experiment is to compare the AdHoc, Checklist, and Scenario detection methods for in-specting software requirements specications.When comparingmultiple treatments, experimenters fre-quently use fractional factorial designs. These designs sys-tematically explore all combinations of the independentvariables, allowing extraneous factors such as team abil-ity, specication quality, and learning to be measured andeliminated from the experimental analysis.Had we used such a design each team would have partic-ipated in three inspection rounds, reviewing each of threespecications and using each of three methods exactly once.3The team and individual fault detection rates are the number offaults detected by a team or individual divided by the total number offaults known to be in the specication. The closer that value is to 1,the more eective the detection method. No faults were intentionallyseeded into the specications. All faults are naturally occurring.
The order in which the methods are applied and the spec-ications are inspected would have been dictated by theexperimental design.Such designs are unacceptable for this study becausethey require some teams to use the Ad Hoc or Checklistmethod after they have used the Scenario method. Sincethe Ad Hoc and Checklist reviewers create their own faultdetection techniques during the inspection (based on theirexperience or their understanding of the checklist), our con-cern was that using the Scenario method in an early roundmight imperceptibly distort the use of the other methodsin later rounds. Such inuences would be undetectable be-cause, unlike the Scenario methods, the Ad Hoc and Check-list methods do not require reviewers to perform specic,auditable tasks.We chose a partial factorial design in which each teamparticipates in two inspections, using some combination ofthe three detection methods, but teams using the Scenariomethod in the rst round must continue to use it in the sec-ond round. Table I shows the settings of the independentvariables.A.3 Threats to Internal ValidityA potential problem in any experiment is that somefactor may aect the dependent variable without the re-searcher's knowledge. This possibility must be minimized.We considered ve such threats: (1) selection eects, (2)maturation eects, (3) replication eects, (4) instrumenta-tion eects, and (5) presentation eects.Selection eects are due to natural variation in humanperformance. For example, random assignment of subjectsmay accidentally create an elite team. Therefore, the dif-ference in this team's natural ability will mask dierencesin the detection method performance. Two approaches areoften taken to limit this eect:1. Create teams with equal skills. For example, rate eachparticipant's background knowledge and experience aseither low, medium, or high and then form teams ofthree by selecting one individual at random from eachexperience category. Detection methods are then as-signed to t the needs of the experiment.2. Compose teams randomly, but require each team touse all three methods. In this way, dierences in team
4skill are spread across all treatments.Neither approach is entirely appropriate. Although weused the rst approach in our initial replication, the ap-proach is unacceptable for multiple replications, becauseeven if teams within a given replication have equal skills,teams from dierent replications will not. As discussed inthe previous section, the second approach is also unsuitablebecause using the Scenarios in the rst inspection Roundwill certainly bias the application of the Ad Hoc or Check-list methods in the second inspection Round.Our strategy for the second replication and future repli-cations is to assign teams and detection methods on a ran-dom basis. However, teams that used Scenarios in the rstround were constrained to use them again in the secondround. This compromise provides more observations ofthe Scenario method and prevents the use of the Scenariomethod from aecting the use of the Ad Hoc or Checklistmethods. However we can't determine whether or not theteams that used only the Scenarios have greater naturalability than the other teams.Maturation eects are due to subjects learning as theexperiment proceeds. We have manipulated the detectionmethod used and the order in which the documents are in-spected so that the presence of this eect can be discoveredand taken into account.Replication eects are caused by dierences in the ma-terials, participants, or execution of multiple replications.We limit this eect by using only rst and second year grad-uate students as subjects - rather than both undergraduateand graduate students. Also, we maintain consistency inour experimental procedures by packaging the experimen-tal procedures as a classroom laboratory exercise. Thishelps us to ensure that similar steps are followed for allreplications. As we will show in Section III, variation inthe fault detection rate is not explained by selection, mat-uration, or replication eects.Finally, instrumentation eects may result from dier-ences in the specication documents. Such variation is im-possible to avoid, but we controlled for it by having eachteam inspect both documents.A.4 Threats to External ValidityThreats to external validity limit our ability to generalizethe results of our experiment to industrial practice. Weidentied three such threats:1. The subjects in our experiment may not be repre-sentative of software programming professionals. Al-though more than half of the subjects have 2 or moreyears of industrial experience, they are graduate stu-dents, not software professionals. Furthermore, as stu-dents they may have dierent motivations for partici-pating in the experiment.2. The specication documents may not be representa-tive of real programming problems. Our experimen-tal specications are atypical of industrial SRS in twoways. First, most of the experimental specication iswritten in a formal requirements notation. (See Sec-tion II-B.) Although several groups at AT&T and else-
















Incorrect or Extra Func.
1.a  Are all data objects mentioned in the ...
2.a  Is the object’s specification consistent ...
...
1.a  Are all values written to each output ...
1.b  Identify at least one function that uses ...
Missing Functionality
...Commission
1.a  Identify the required precision, response ...








Missing (or ambiguous) functionalityFig. 2. Relationship Between Fault Detection Methods. The gure depicts the relationship between the fault detectionmethods usedin this study. The vertical extent represents the coverage. The horizontal axis labels the method and represents the degree of detail (thegreater the horizontal extent the greater the detail). Moving from Ad Hoc to Checklist to Scenario there is more detail and less coverage.The gaps in the Scenario and Checklist columns indicate that the Checklist is a subset of the Ad Hoc and the Scenarios are a subset ofthe Checklist.while the other three sections are specied using the SCRtabular requirements notation [13].For this experiment, all three documents were adapted toadhere to the IEEE suggested format [2]. All faults presentin these SRS appear in the original documents or were gen-erated during the adaptation process; no faults were inten-tionally seeded into the document. The authors discovered42 faults in the WLMS SRS; and 26 in the CRUISE SRS.The authors did not inspect the ELEVATOR SRS since itwas used only for training exercises.B.1.a Elevator Control System (ELEVATOR). [14] de-scribes the functional and performance requirements of asystem for monitoring the operation of a bank of elevators(16 pages).B.1.b Water Level Monitoring System (WLMS). [15]describes the functional and performance requirements ofa system for monitoring the operation of a steam generatingsystem (24 pages).B.1.c Automobile Cruise Control System (CRUISE). [16]describes the functional and performance requirements foran automobile cruise control system (31 pages).B.2 Fault Detection MethodsTo make a fair assessment of the three detection meth-ods (Ad Hoc, Checklist, and Scenario) each method shouldsearch for a well-dened population of faults. To accom-plish this, we used a general fault taxonomy to dene theresponsibilities of Ad Hoc reviewers.The checklist used in this study is a renement of thetaxonomy. Consequently, Checklist responsibilities are asubset of the Ad Hoc responsibilities.The Scenarios are derived from the checklist by replac-ing individual Checklist items with procedures designed toimplement them. As a result, Scenario responsibilities aredistinct subsets of Checklist and Ad Hoc responsibilities.The relationship between the three methods is depicted inFigure 2.
The taxonomy is a composite of two schemes developedby Schneider, et al. [17] and Basili and Weiss [18]. Faultsare divided into two broad types: omission { in which im-portant information is left unstated and commission { inwhich incorrect, redundant, or ambiguous information isput into the SRS by the author. Omission faults were fur-ther subdivided into four categories: Missing Functionality,Missing Performance, Missing Environment, and MissingInterface. Commission faults were also divided into fourcategories: Ambiguous Information, Inconsistent Informa-tion, Incorrect or Extra Functionality, and Wrong Section.(See Appendix A for complete taxonomy.) We provided acopy of the taxonomy to each reviewer. Ad Hoc reviewersreceived no further assistance.Checklist reviewers received a single checklist derivedfrom the fault taxonomy. To generate the checklist we pop-ulated the fault taxonomy with detailed questions culledfrom several industrial checklists. Thus, the checklist itemsare similar in style to those found in several large organi-zations. All Checklist reviewers used the same checklist.(See Appendix B for the complete checklist.)Finally, we developed three groups of Scenarios. Eachgroup of Scenarios was designed for a specic subset of theChecklist items:1. Data Type Inconsistencies (DF),2. Incorrect Functionalities (IF),3. Missing or Ambiguous Functionalities (MF).After the experiment was nished we applied the Sce-narios ourselves to estimate how broadly they covered theWLMS and CRUISE faults (i.e., what percentage of de-fects could be found if the Scenarios are properly applied.)We estimated that the Scenarios address about half of thefaults that are covered by the Checklist. Appendix C con-tains the complete list of Scenarios.B.3 Fault Report FormsWe also developed a Fault Report Form. Whenever apotential fault was discovered { during either the fault de-
6
Fig. 3. Reviewer Fault Report Form. This is a small sample of the fault report form completed during each reviewer's fault detection.Faults number 10 and 11, found by reviewer 12 of team C for the WLMS specication are shown.tection or the collection activities { an entry was madeon the form. The entry included four kinds of information:Inspection Activity (Detection, Collection); Fault Location(Page and Line Numbers); Fault Disposition, (Faults canbe True Faults or False Positives); and a prose Fault De-scription. A small sample of a Fault Report appears inFigure 3.C. Experiment PreparationThe participants were given two, 75 minute lectures onsoftware requirements specications, the SCR tabular re-quirements notation, inspection procedures, the fault clas-sication scheme, and the lling out of data collectionforms. The references for these lectures were Fagan [5],Parnas [4], and the IEEE Guide to Software RequirementsSpecications [19]. The participants were then assembledinto three-person teams { see Section II-A.3 for details.Within each team, members were randomly assigned toact as the moderator, the recorder, or the reader duringthe collection meeting.D. Conducting the ExperimentD.1 TrainingFor the training exercise, each team inspected the ELE-VATOR SRS. Individual team members read the specica-tion and recorded all faults they found on a Fault ReportForm. Their eorts were restricted to two hours. Later wemet with the participants and answered questions aboutthe experimental procedures. Afterwards, each team con-ducted a supervised collection meeting and lled out a mas-ter Fault Report Form for the entire team. The ELEVA-
TOR SRS was not used in the remainder of the experiment.D.2 Experimental PhaseThis phase involved two inspection rounds. The instru-ments used were the WLMS and CRUISE specicationsdiscussed in Section II-B.1, a checklist, three groups offault-based scenarios, and the Fault Report Form. Thedevelopment of the checklist and scenarios is described inSection II-B.2. The same checklist and scenarios were usedfor both documents.During the rst Round, four of the eight teams wereasked to inspect the CRUISE specication; the remainingfour teams inspected the WLMS specication. The de-tection methods used by each team are shown in Table I.Fault detection was limited to two hours, and all potentialfaults were reported on the Fault Report Form. After faultdetection, all materials were collected.4Once all team members had nished fault detection, theteam's moderator arranged for the collection meeting. Atthe collection meeting, the reader paraphrases each require-ment. During this paraphrasing activity, reviewers maybring up any issues found during preparation or discussnew issues. The team's recorder maintained the team'smaster Fault Report Form. Collection was also limited to2 hours and the entire Round was completed in one week.The collection meeting process is the same regardless ofwhich fault detection method was used during fault detec-tion.4For each round, we set aside 14 two-hour time slots during whichinspection tasks could be done. Participants performed each taskwithin a single two-hour session and were not allowed to work atother times.
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0Fig. 5. Individual and Team Fault Summaries (CRUISE). This gure shows the data collected from one team's CRUISE inspection.The data is identical to that of the WLMS inspections except that the CRUISE has fewer faults { 26 versus 42 for the WLMS { and thefault key is dierent.The second Round was similar to the rst except thatteams who had inspected the WLMS during Round 1 in-spected the CRUISE in Round 2 and vice versa.III. Data and AnalysisA. DataThree sets of data are important to our study: the faultkey, the team fault summaries, and the individual faultsummaries.The fault key encodes which reviewers are responsible foreach fault. In this study, reviewer responsibilities are de-ned by the detection techniques a reviewer uses. Ad Hocreviewers are responsible (asked to search for) for all faults.Checklist reviewers are responsible for a large subset of theAd Hoc faults5. Since each Scenario is a renement of sev-eral Checklist items, each Scenario reviewer6 is responsiblefor a distinct subset of the Checklist faults.The team fault summary shows whether or not a teamdiscovered a particular fault. This data is gathered fromthe fault report forms lled out at the collection meetingsand is used to assess the eectiveness of each fault detectionmethod.The individual fault summary shows whether or not a re-viewer discovered a particular fault. This data is gatheredfrom the fault report forms each reviewer completed during5i.e., faults for which an Ad Hoc reviewer is responsible.6i.e., reviewers using Scenarios.





























Mon Apr 11 12:32:47 CDT 1994Fig. 6. Fault Detection Rates by Independent Variable. The dashes in the far left column show each team's fault detection rate forthe WLMS and CRUISE. The horizontal line is the average fault detection rate. The plot demonstrates the ability of each variable toexplain variation in the fault detection rates. For the Specication variable, the vertical location of WLMS (CRUISE) is determined byaveraging the fault detection rates for all teams inspecting WLMS (CRUISE). The vertical bracket, ], to the right of each variable showsone standard error of the dierence between two settings of the variable. The plot indicates that both the Method and Specication aresignicant; but Round, Replication, and Order are not.Independent SST T SSR R (SST =T )(R=SSR) SignicanceVariable LevelDetection Method { treatment .200 2 .359 29 8.064 < :01Specication{ instrumentation .163 1 .396 30 12.338 < :01Inspection round { maturation .007 1 .551 30 .391 .54Experimental run { replication .007 1 .551 30 .391 .54Order { presentation .003 1 .003 30 .141 .71Team composition { selection .289 15 .268 16 1.151 .39TABLE IIAnalysis of Variance for Each Independent Variable. The analysis of variance shows that only the choice of detectionmethod and specification significantly explain variation in the fault detection rate. Team composition is also notsignificant.Next, we analyzed the combined Instrumentation andTreatment eects. Table III shows the input to this anal-ysis. Six of the cells contain the average detection rate forteams using each detection method and specication (3 de-tection methods applied to 2 specications). The results ofthis analysis, shown in Table IV, indicate that the interac-tion between Specication and Method is not signicant.This means that although the average detection rates var-ied for the two specications, the eect of the detectionmethods is not linked to these dierences. Therefore, wereject the null hypothesis that the detection methods haveno eect on inspection performance.
C. Eect of Scenarios on Individual PerformanceWe initially hypothesized that increasing the specializa-tion and coordination of each reviewer's responsibilitieswould improve team performance. We proposed that theScenario would be one way to achieve this. We have shownabove that the teams using Scenarios were the most eec-tive. However, this did not establish that the improvementwas due to increases in specialization and coordination, andnot to some other factor.Some alternative explanations for the observed improve-ment could be (1) the Scenario reviewers responded to someperceived expectation that their performance should im-prove; or (2) the Scenario approach improves individual
9Specication Detection MethodAd Hoc Checklist ScenarioWLMS .5 .38 .29 .5 .48 .45 .29 .52 .5 .33 .74 .57 .55 .4 .62 .55(average) .43 .41 .57Cruise .46 .27 .27 .23 .38 .23 .35 .19 .31 .23 .23 .5 .42 .42 .54 .35(average) .31 .24 .45TABLE IIITeam Fault Detection Rate Data. The nominal and average fault detection rates for all 16 teams.Eect SST T SSR R (SST =T )(R=SSR) SignicanceLevelDetection Method .200 2 .212 26 12.235 < :01Specication .143 1 .212 26 17.556 < :01MethSpec .004 2 .212 26 .217 .806TABLE IVAnalysis of Variance of Detection Method and Specication. This table displays the results of an analysis of the varianceof the average detection rates given in Table III.performance regardless of Scenario content. Consequently,our concern is to determine exactly how the use of Scenar-ios aected the reviewer's performance. To examine this,we formulated two hypothesis schemas. H1: Method X reviewers do not nd any moreX faults than do method Y reviewers. H2: Method X reviewers nd either a greateror smaller number of non X faults than domethod Y reviewers.C.1 Rejecting the Perceived Expectation ArgumentIf Scenario reviewers performed better than Checklistand Ad Hoc reviewers on both scenario-targeted and non-scenario-targeted faults, then we must consider the pos-sibility that their improvement was caused by somethingother than the scenarios themselves.One possibility was that the Scenario reviewers weremerely reacting to the novelty of using a clearly dierentapproach, or to a perceived expectation on our part thattheir performance should improve. To examine this we an-alyzed the individual fault summaries to see how Scenarioreviewers diered from other reviewers.The detection rates of Scenario reviewers are comparedwith those of all other reviewers in Tables V, VI, VIIand VIII. Using the one and two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests [20], we found that in most cases Scenarioreviewers were more eective than Checklist or Ad Hocreviewers at nding the faults the scenario was designedto uncover. At the same time, all reviewers, regardless ofwhich detection method each used, were equally eectiveat nding those faults not targeted by any of the Scenarios.Since Scenario reviewers could not have known the faultclassications, it is unlikely that their reporting could havebeen biased. Therefore these results suggest that the de-tection rate of Scenario reviewers shows improvement only
with regard to those faults for which they are explicitlyresponsible. Consequently, the argument that the Sce-nario reviewers' improved performance was primarily dueto raised expectations or unknown motivational factors isnot supported by the data.C.2 Rejecting the General Improvement ArgumentAnother possibility is that the Scenario approach ratherthan the content of the Scenarios was responsible for theimprovement.Each Scenario targets a specic set of faults. If the re-viewers using a type X Scenario had been no more eectiveat nding type X faults than had reviewers using non-XScenarios, then the content of the Scenarios did not sig-nicantly inuence reviewer performance. If the reviewersusing a type X Scenario had been more eective at nd-ing non-X faults than had reviewers using other Scenarios,then some factor beyond content caused the improvement.To explore these possibilities we compared the Scenario re-viewers' individual fault summaries with each other.Looking again at Tables V, VI, VII, and VIII we see thateach group of Scenario reviewers was the most eective atnding the faults their Scenarios were designed to detect,but was generally no more eective than other Scenario re-viewers at nding faults their Scenarios were not designedto detect. Since Scenario reviewers showed improvementin nding only the faults for which they were explicitlyresponsible, we conclude that the content of the Scenariowas primarily responsible for the improved reviewer per-formance.D. Analysis of Checklists on Individual PerformanceThe scenarios used in this study were derived from thechecklist. Although this checklist targeted a large num-ber of existing faults, our analysis shows that the perfor-
10Reviewers Using Method Finding Faults of Type Compared with Reviewers using MethodDetection Number Fault NumberMethod Reviewers Population Present DT MF IF CH AHDT 6 DT 14 - .02 .06 .01 .02(6.5) (3) (4.5) (4) (4)MF 6 MF 5 .07 - .12 .02 .04(0.5) (2) (1) (0) (1)IF 6 IF 5 .01 .01 - .04 .01(0) (1) (1.5) (1) (1)CH 12 CH 38 .95 .86 .89 - .51(10.5) (11) (12.5) (8) (10)AH 18 AH 42 .91 .84 .75 .37 -(12) (12.5) (13) (9.5) (11)TABLE VSignicance Table for H1 hypotheses: WLMS inspections. This table tests the H1 hypothesis - Method X reviewers do notfind any more X faults than do method Y reviewers - for all pairs of detection methods. Each row in the tablecorresponds to a population of reviewers and the population of faults for which they were responsible, i.e., method Xreviewers and X faults. The last five columns correspond to a second reviewer population, i.e., method Y reviewers. Eachcell in the last five columns contains two values. The first value is the probability that H1 is true, using the one-sidedWilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The second value { in parentheses { is the median number of faults found by the method Yreviewers.Reviewers Using Method Finding Faults of Type Compared with Reviewers using MethodDetection Number Fault NumberMethod Reviewers Population Present DT MF IF CH AHDT 5 DT 10 - .05 .03 < :01 .02(6) (3) (2) (1) (3)MF 5 MF 1 NA - NA NA NA(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)IF 5 IF 3 NA NA - NA NA(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)CH 12 CH 24 > :99 .95 .93 - .98(8) (5) (4) (2.5) (5)AH 21 AH 26 .96 .50 .41 .02 -(8) (5) (5) (3) (5)TABLE VISignicance Table for H1 hypotheses: CRUISE inspections. This analysis is identical to that performed for WLMSinspections. However, we chose not to perform any statistical analysis for the Missing Functionality and IncorrectFunctionality faults because there are too few faults of those types.mance of Checklist teams were no more eective than AdHoc teams. One explanation for this is that nonsystematictechniques are dicult for reviewers to implement.To study this explanation we again tested the H1 hy-pothesis that Checklist reviewers were no more eectivethan Ad Hoc reviewers at nding Checklist faults. FromTables V and VI we see that even though the Checklist tar-gets a large number of faults, it does not actually improvea reviewer's ability to nd those faults.E. Analysis of Collection MeetingsIn his original paper on software inspections Fagan [5]asserts that
Sometimes agrant errors are found during : : :[fault detection], but in general, the number oferrors found is not nearly as high as in the : : :[collection meeting] operation.From a study of over 50 inspections, Votta [3] collecteddata that strongly contradicts this assertion. In this Sec-tion, we measure the benets of collection meetings by com-paring the team and individual fault summaries to deter-mine the meeting gain and meeting loss rates. (See Figure 4and Figure 5).A \meeting gain" occurs when a fault is found for therst time at the collection meeting. A \meeting loss" oc-curs when a fault is rst found during an individual's fault
11Reviewers Using Method Finding Faults of Type Compared with Reviewers using MethodDetection Number Fault NumberMethod Reviewers Population Present DT MF IF CH AHDT 6 DTc 28 - .92 .82 .50 .64(4.5) (9) (7.5) (5.5) (6)MF 6 MFc 37 .87 - .83 .56 .64(11) (9.5) (12.5) (8.5) (10)IF 6 IFc 37 .66 .53 - .24 .27(11) (12) (11.5) (8.5) (10)CH 12 CHc 4 .12 .28 .35 - .07(0.5) (1) (1) (1) (1)AH 18 AHc 0 NA NA NA NA {(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)TABLE VIISignicance Table for H2 hypothesis: WLMS inspections. This table tests the H2 hypothesis - Method X reviewers find agreater or smaller number of non X faults than do method Y reviewers - for all pairs of detection methods. Each row inthe table corresponds to a population of reviewers and the population of faults for which they were not responsible - i.e.,method X reviewers and non X faults (the complement of the set of X faults). The last five columns correspond to asecond reviewer population, i.e., method Y reviewers. Each cell in the last five columns contains two values. The firstvalue is the probability that H2 is true, using the two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The second value is the mediannumber of faults found by the method Y reviewers.Reviewers Using Method Finding Faults of Type Compared with Reviewers using MethodDetection Number Fault NumberMethod Reviewers Population Present DT MF IF CH AHDT 5 DTc 16 - .59 .86 .37 .46(2) (2) (3) (2) (2)MF 5 MFc 25 .96 { .33 .06 .62(8) (5) (4) (3) (5)IF 5 IFc 23 .96 .41 { .44 .57(8) (4) (5) (2.5) (5)CH 12 CHc 2 NA NA NA { NA(0) (1) (0) (0) (0)AH 21 AHc 0 NA NA NA NA {(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)TABLE VIIISignicance Table for H2 hypothesis: CRUISE inspections. This analysis is identical to that performed for WLMSinspections. However, we chose not to perform statistical analysis for the non Checklist faults because there are too fewfaults of that type.detection activity, but it is subsequently not recorded dur-ing the collection meeting. Meeting gains may thus beoset by meeting losses and the dierence between meet-ing gains and meeting losses is the net improvement dueto collection meetings. Our results indicate that collectionmeetings produce no net improvement.E.1 Meeting GainsThe meeting gain rates reported by Votta were a negli-gible 3:9  :7%. Our data tells a similar story. (Figure 7displays the meeting gain rates for WLMS inspections.)The mean gain rate is 4:7  1:3% for WLMS inspectionsand 3:1 1:1% for CRUISE inspections. The rates are not



























Fig. 7. Meeting Gains for WLMS Inspections. Each point represents the meeting gain rate for a single inspection, i.e., the number offaults rst identied at a collection meeting divided by the total number of faults in the specication. Each rate is marked with symbolindicating the inspection method used. The vertical line segment through each symbol indicates one standard deviation in the estimate(assuming each fault was a Bernoulli trial). This information helps in assessing the signicance of any one rate. The average meetinggain rate is 4:7 1:3% for the WLMS. (3:1 1:1% for the CRUISE.)erature. However, since the interval between the detectionand collection activities is usually longer in practice thanit was in our experiment (one to two days in our study ver-sus one or two weeks in practice), this eect may be quitesignicant.E.3 Net Meeting ImprovementThe average net meeting improvement is  :9  2:2 forWLMS inspections and  1:21:7 for CRUISE inspections.(Figure 9 displays the net meeting improvement for WLMSinspections.) We found no correlations between the loss,gain, or net improvement rates and any of our experiment'sindependent variables.IV. Summary and ConclusionsOur experimental design for comparing fault detectionmethods is exible and economical, and allows the exper-imenter to assess several potential threats to the experi-ment's internal validity. In particular, we determined thatneither maturation, replication, selection, or presentationeects had any signicant inuence on inspection perfor-mance. However, dierences in the SRS did.From our analysis of the experimental data we drew sev-eral conclusions. As with any experiment these conclusionsapply only to the experimental setting from which they aredrawn. Readers must carefully consider the threats to ex-ternal validity described in Section II-A.4 before attempt-ing to generalize these results.1. The fault detection rate when using Scenar-ios was superior to that obtained with AdHoc or Checklist methods { an improvementof roughly 35%.2. Scenarios helped reviewers focus on specicfault classes. Furthermore, in comparison to Ad

























































Fig. 9. Net Meeting Improvement for WLMS. Each symbol indicates the net meeting improvement for a single inspection. The averagenet meeting improvement rate is  :9 2:2 for the WLMS. ( 1:2 1:7 for the CRUISE). These rates are not signicantly dierent from0.What are the signicant suppression mechanisms af-fecting collection meetings? Very few faults are initially discovered during collec-tion meetings. Therefore, in view of their impact ondevelopment interval (calendar time to complete de-velopment), are these meetings worth holding? More than half of the faults are not addressed by theScenarios used in this study. What other Scenarios arenecessary to achieve a broader fault coverage? There are several threats to this experiment's exter-nal validity. These threats can only be addressed byreplicating and reproducing these studies. Each newrun reduces the probability that our results can be
explained by human variation or experimental error.Consequently, we are creating a laboratory kit (i.e.,a package containing all the experimental materials,data, and analysis) to facilitate replication. The kit isavailable via anonymous ftp at ftp.cs.umd.edu. Finally, we are using the lab kit to reproduce the ex-periments with other university researchers in Japan,Germany, Italy, and Australia and with industrial de-velopers at AT&T Bell Laboratories and Motorola Inc.These studies will allow us to evaluate our hypotheseswith dierent populations of programmers and dier-ent software artifacts.
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AppendixI. Ad Hoc DetectionThe fault taxonomy is due to the work of Schneider, etal., and Basili and Weiss. Omission{ Missing Functionality: Information describing thedesired internal operational behavior of the systemhas been omitted from the SRS.{ Missing Performance: Information describing thedesired performance specications has either beenomitted or described in a way that is unacceptablefor acceptance testing.{ Missing Interface: Information describing how theproposed system will interface and communicatewith objects outside the the scope of the system hasbeen omitted from the SRS.{ Missing Environment: Information describing the re-quired hardware, software, database, or personnelenvironment in which the system will run has beenomitted from the SRS Commission{ Ambiguous Information: An important term, phraseor sentence essential to the understanding of systembehavior has either been left undened or dened ina way that can cause confusion and misunderstand-ing.{ Inconsistent Information: Two sentences containedin the SRS directly contradict each other or expressactions that cannot both be correct or cannot bothbe carried out.{ Incorrect Fact: Some sentence contained in the SRSasserts a facts that cannot be true under the condi-tions specied in the SRS.{ Wrong Section: Essential information is misplacedwithin the SRSII. Checklist Method General{ Are the goals of the system dened?{ Are the requirements clear and unambiguous?{ Is a functional overview of the system provided?{ Is an overview of the operational modes provided?{ Have the software and hardware environments beenspecied?{ If assumptions that aect implementation have beenmade, are they stated?{ Have the requirements been stated in terms of inputs,outputs, and processing for each function?{ Are all functions, devices, constraints traced to re-quirements and vice versa?{ Are the required attributes, assumptions and con-straints of the system completely listed? Omission{ Missing Functionality Are the described functions sucient to meet thesystem objectives?
15 Are all inputs to a function sucient to performthe required function? Are undesired events considered and their requiredresponses specied? Are the initial and special states considered (e.g.,system initiation, abnormal termination)?{ Missing Performance Can the system be tested, demonstrated, analyzed,or inspected to show that it satises the require-ments? Have the data type, rate, units, accuracy, resolu-tion, limits, range and critical values for all internal data items been specied? Have the accuracy, precision, range, type, rate,units, frequency, and volume of inputs and out-puts been specied for each function?{ Missing Interface Are the inputs and outputs for all interfaces su-cient? Are the interface requirements between hardware,software, personnel, and procedures included?{ Missing Environment Have the functionality of hardware or software in-teracting with the system been properly speci-ed? Commission{ Ambiguous Information Are the individual requirements stated so that theyare discrete, unambiguous, and testable? Are all mode transitions specied deterministicly?{ Inconsistent Information Are the requirements mutually consistent? Are the functional requirements consistent with theoverview? Are the functional requirements consistent with theactual operating environment?{ Incorrect or Extra Functionality Are all the described functions necessary to meetthe system objectives? Are all inputs to a function necessary to performthe required function? Are the inputs and outputs for all interfaces nec-essary? Are all the outputs produced by a function used byanother function or transferred across an exter-nal interface?{ Wrong Section Are all the requirements, interfaces, constraints,etc. listed in the appropriate sections.III. ScenariosA. Data Type Consistency Scenario1. Identify all data objects mentioned in the overview(e.g., hardware component, application variable, ab-breviated term or function)(a) Are all data objects mentioned in the overviewlisted in the external interface section?
2. For each data object appearing in the external inter-face section determine the following information: Object name: Class: (e.g., input port, output port, application vari-able, abbreviated term, function) Data type: (e.g., integer, time, boolean, enumera-tion) Acceptable values: Are there any constraints, ranges,limits for the values of this object Failure value: Does the object have a special failurevalue? Units or rates: Initial value:(a) Is the object's specication consistent with its de-scription in the overview?(b) If object represents a physical quantity, are its unitsproperly specied?(c) If the object's value is computed, can that compu-tation generate a non-acceptable value?3. For each functional requirement identify all data ob-ject references:(a) Do all data object references obey formatting con-ventions?(b) Are all data objects referenced in this requirementlisted in the input or output sections?(c) Can any data object use be inconsistent with thedata object's type, acceptable values, failure value,etc.?(d) Can any data object denition be inconsistent withthe data object's type, acceptable values, failurevalue, etc.?B. Incorrect Functionality Scenario1. For each functional requirement identify all in-put/output data objects:(a) Are all values written to each output data objectconsistent with its intended function?(b) Identify at least one function that uses each outputdata object.2. For each functional requirement identify all speciedsystem events:(a) Is the specication of these events consistent withtheir intended interpretation?3. Develop an invariant for each system mode (i.e. Un-der what conditions must the system exit or remain ina given mode)?(a) Can the system's initial conditions fail to satisfythe initial mode's invariant?(b) Identify a sequence of events that allows the sys-tem to enter a mode without satisfying the mode'sinvariant.(c) Identify a sequence of events that allows the systemto enter a mode, but never leave (deadlock).C. Ambiguities Or Missing Functionality Scenario1. Identify the required precision, response time, etc. foreach functional requirement.
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